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FROM SUNNA TO SMRITI: A ROADMAP
OF RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

Faiz Tajuddin'
Introduction
Every religion, essentially; bases itself on rules that dictate a particular way of life. In most cases, these rules
find their source in the traditions of that religion. Under Hindu law, religious traditions occur in the form
of the Stnrit,' while in Islamic law; traditions are manifested in the Sunna,2 or utterances of the Prophet.
Religious traditions lay down guidelines regarding behaviour and actions:' these guidelines are structured
around a normative ideal image' that is generally reinforced by the backing of a religious figure or structure.
This includes Manu, Prophet Mohammad, and Christ in Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity respectively.
The nature of tradition as a source of law in religious juristic thought has been widely interpreted, analyzed,
and studied. However, most discussions of religious traditions centre on a top-down approach that looks
at the rise of tradition purely in the context of the religion in question. To understand this better, two
aspects of religious tradition mandate a closer look. The first of these is the origin of the traditions, which
traces the evolution of cach of the traditions, and outlines the basis on which they find justification. The
second is the methodology by which these traditions are applied in practical situations to determine the
correct course of action. The top-down approach involves the explanation of the origin and methodology
of these traditions from a perspective that is strictly internal to that religion alone. According to this
approach, the basis for justification of these traditions is the felt need to explain religion in its own context.
As a result, universal factors such as political, social, and economic conditions, which actually contribute to
the evolution of a faith, are ignored. This approach' is coloured, in that it tends to focus, in a self-

II Year RA., LL13.(Hons) Student, National Law School of India University I would like to thank Professor GV
Ajiappa for his invaluable advice and commoens in the course of the writing of thus paper.
MNILuA,PRLcOLEs Oi HiNix Law 2 (1994).
MuTt, PRINI.PEs Or MAHOMAMNlRN [,,,W \X (1999)
Mcus, smpra note 1, at 3, where it is stated that, "The soaures fwsm which knosdr4 of linda Lam, is to be desised of/be indias
of Dharma have beenstaled by Hind jurisu. The Veda, the Smrii, the apprwed usage and aot is agreeableto god wonaince at?
acardNg b Mann, the highest athny> on th hs the quadrnpk trect ewener of dharma." See also supra note 2, at 22, where
it is described, that "there are frr sorres of Maoedon lau name#, the Koran, the Hadis, ljma a&d Qiyas."
"The regifo of the ethical ir a region of disce, certain/ incopadile and possib4 pracical# conflicting ideal inqes or pictsres ?f
hnon hfe." PRE Strawson, Social Moajfr and the IndiidualIdeal, 36 Philosoply 1 (1963).
"In practi, a reigion is a partiathrpstem, or a set ofpstems, tm ainch doctsines, my/b, Yiuals, sentiKSngin, sastitidos and s/Ctt
element: are connected Thu, in order to understand a gian bedef that ofra injuch a Jysism, i is nteresarf/tolook a4 its parfscussr
on/ent - s/wit i4 other belifs beld in the pstem, rina/4 and other aspects." 26 NEw ENccooPrmDIA BRITAMN1cA 509 (1991). But a
modidied approach is hinted at "Tha, ten arises the probem of wether or not one Wklf orpractie embedded in an sgoani
rengon has n
system can propery be cerpored to a similar iem i another organic pytem. To put the ma/ter in another mi er
nmqne prmperes, and attemptr to make iater-nrehons comparseons may hide Mhesenine aspects. Alost ients of regan argo,
boweir, that irkd bcmonsore arrposible, hengh thy are dfisuit to make."
&ee A.M. BHArrACHARJE., HiNov LAW AND TH. CONSrrUnoN 23 (1994), where he critiques the view of the divine origin
re
nae/ad S
of the Sma'ir. He feels that the Smdidi were "based on and dr*red fron immemonal auors and usages Abih
hornm a phrasefue the Bnidsh jurirprrem the conson curoms of the readm and thus became the Common Laws of the reas'
This becomes important in later interpretative arguments presented in this paper. He also stales: "the Brambnaid
supeniary iself was based epon the anthaide of the Srmriis; and if reprganca so popularfeelns ere aaqped as afori a grand
for ilargahg leas of ise namees tbe foundnis of the srcearny of their ms/ m-ssd he mart unsafk" For an example fnm
Islamic law, see B.R. V.aRst, COMiENTARiEs O.N MONAmoiRDAN LAw 13 (1997), where he explains Senna as a consequence

of the coming of Mohammad.
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aggrandizing manner, on those aspects of the traditions in question that give the faith its strengths and
uniqueness. This model does not discuss the real reasons for the evolution of a faith- A more rational
approach would be to look towards similarities between religions and not focus on uniqueness or
dissinilarities, and would be important because it would bring to light certain aspects of religion and law

that are otherwise pushed into the background by rhetoric and religious chauvinism. It would also be a
more factual analysis, and better suited to yield practical and truthful information. As will be subsequently
shown, there are more points of similarity between religions than there are differences - especially in the
context of factors that led to their origin and the method by which they have evolved. The essence of the
point is this - the picture that is generally drawn is that of independent belief structures that have nothing
in common with (and are, indeed, anathema to) one another. The cause, therefore, of religious
differentiation lies not in the religion itself, but factors that led to the evolution of religion, which means
that what came first was the ground reality of daily life, and not the priest or the Prophet. However, with the
steady crystallization of religion, it is this point that has, unfortunately, been forgotten. The implications of
this point of view are tremendous and in order to better understand them, a look into the past for similar
causes of development between religions, for similar methodologies and traits, is a good starting point for
analysis.

The Dynamic Model of Change
This paper attempts an interpretative analysis, ie., it looks at religious traditions as arising out of
particular social and political circumstances. It interprets religious traditions from the perspective of the
settings in which they evolved and attempts to debunk the notion of permanency of religious
differentiation between different communities. At the end of this exercise, a simple proposition arises that most religions evolve the same way, responding to different, and changing, ground realities. The
cause of differences between faiths and sub-schools of faiths is, therefore, dynamic. As a community
evolves and social, political, and economic conditions change, so would its beliefs, if given due freedom.
Instead, there is a natural tendency to believe that religions - and religious traditions - are justifications
for their own existence. Traditions within a religion are believed to possess an apioribasis' - that of the
religion itself. But there is more than an apnioi logic to these evolutions. An examination of this will
provide a better understanding of religious traditions. This paper will show that religious traditions
have all developed as responses to particular, easily identifiable stimulating factors. When these stimuli
fade away or are replaced by different, newer stimuli, the older tradition should logically give way to a
newer, more evolved version. Furthermore, as compared to the narrow top-down approach that looks
at each faith as a complete whole in itself and explains the faith on the basis of the vocabulary of that
faith and not a more universal vocabulary, the interpretative approach also has the advantage of being
comprehensive. The explanations that are offered look at broad social, economic, and political factors,
which are echoed in the genesis of all faiths, and not merely religious factors. The paper also adopts a
comparative approach, in that it compares the consistencies and commonalities of religious traditions.

Se).j

1

DUNCAN
-DriEurr, RFiuioN, LAW ANDTr. STTE IN INDIA 22 (1999).
This refers to the belief that one's faith does not require an explanaoion for ats existence beyond what the religion
itself states. The faith derives its importance and meaning from the terms of reference it chooses. See id., at 36.
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An important question arises at this point - what is so special about religious traditions that make them
so crucial to this discussion? Traditions are examined because of their longevity and their role in framing
law The longer they operate, the greater their effect; and from this perspective, the change brought about
by a new tradition becomes obvious. Duncan M. Derrett says:
"... the intelectual position and claims of the Dbarmashastras remain, like its sister disaifines,
the Torah of Moses and the Shariat, immutable and immortal, Hnefcted ly the srpares of
Judges and the tramient preferences of legslatres." 9
When looking at the evolution of traditions, it is pertinent to note that there are areas where, under the
umbrella of the same faith, different traditions develop in different sub-schools of that faith. This may
be for a variety of reasons, but one major revelation that comes up is that the boundaries that are so
assiduously drawn between different faiths may not be as strong as they purport to be."'
Tradition as a Source of Law in the Hindu and Islamic Faiths
The sources of law for various religious faiths find within themselves various overlaps and
commonalities. There are reasons both in substance and form for these overlaps that exist. The central
one among them is the basic structure and nature of religion. This is generally similar to all faiths and
consists of the prescription of certain modes of behaviour and action. Religion prescribes a particular
way of life, and differentiates between behaviour that is acceptable and that which is not. Having made
this distinction between good and evil, religion imposes certain sanctions and benefits" in furtherance
of the agreeable types of behaviour. The story of religion, then, is the story of these rights and wrongs
and the accompanying punishments and rewards. The most important result of looking at religion
from this perspective is the revelation that the operation of religion is quite similar to that of law. Both
employ, for example, certain deterrents to avoid wrongful behaviour. One can then look to the
development of religious law. It is found that as far as religious jurisprudence is concerned, there are
clear signs of adaptation and change and, more importantly, a race towards relevance and legitimacy that
seems common to all religions. This reveals some important things. Law and religion operate in similar
manners and in order to be effective, evolve through a necessary feedback system from the society they
serve. Religious law can be understood from the point of view of its legal characteristics. Therefore, just
as all legal systems respond in comparable, if not similar, ways to certain factors, all religions do as well.
It is this mechanism that is common to all religions. Religious traditions are the best indicators of this

'

Id at 108,

Joswii ScHACHT, A\ iNTMu)(oTiow To IstA\ic LAv 11 (1997) for an analysis of the differences between religious
traditons in Medina and Kuf'a as an example,
"teicion supports n/moal by
0 o means chify. iwy/h and iaboe. Alytb cades the supenatural Moed throngh wich clestial sanctions
may be mvento forms of cocnmt saealbp desimble; heambnh hoapes and aerors inspire the disidalto put it
ithb as/raintsphiod rpon
See

"

him by his masters and his pvap. Man is not naturdi/y obedin, gentle or chaste; and next to thnt anient compelsion which f}i/

geemies condem, aothing so qnietly and costins/ conduaces
OUR Oirn.T

to i/se retnongenial 'irtues as the fear of tMe Godc"

HERITAc.r 69 (1963),
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development. Tradition connotes a sequence of events or a manner of behaviour or action that finds its
legitimacy in the past." A religious legitimacy" is ascribed to religious traditions and through this
process, these traditions provide, as shall be subsequently shown," a basis for the development of
legality around them, This will be discussed in the context of both Hindu and Islamic jurisprudence.'To summarize the argument, traditions arise as a consequence of, and in the course of, adjustment in
society. This adjustment involves the interpretation and adaptation of customs 6 and religious texts to
the changing needs of society. Traditions are the tools of religions that operate in a similar manner
across religious divides. This is not to say that differences do not exist within a society and between
societies. Indeed, these differences are the basis on which differing traditions and schools of law have
grown. They are factors such as geographical separation and cultural diversity. The point to be made is,
tentatively, this - an understanding of the factors that really go into the evolution of religions reveals
that the lines of segregation that exist in our world today are formed on the basis of certain observable
and changing conditions. There is no doubting the fact that religious rules play an important role in
peoples' lives." Unfortunately, the picture that is created through this powerful force is that of inherent
differences existing between religions. This is a mistaken belief.

Sunna and its Ramifications
Contrasts - the Islamic Axis
Before commencing an analysis of Islamic traditions, it should be noted that there are some differences
attributed to the natures and methods of formation of Islam and Judaism, in a comparison of the
three major faiths of the book (Judaism, Islam, and Christianity). Jewish law has been seen as a process
forced upon a people, which resulted in a form of cohesion." Hlowever, Islam and Christianity both
" A basic
practice."
to bm
Phaisees

definition of tradition describes it as "a custom, opinion or hedef banded donw to poatedt, erpera/l ora' or Irr
Religious or theological tradition would in this context be described as "doe/ne or a pariro/ar doeome chimed
sIch as the oral teachings of Chek/ and te Aposlks, te lane heoidl5 tihe
infle auboiy nlhout documentary emeience,
to bare been delibred by God to Moaser and he iords and deed of MAhammad not in ie Koran." SeeTHM Coxcis Ox00o1o

DIcnJO1CARY Or CURRrNT ENGLISH 1293 (1994).

Religious legitimacy, as is subsequently referred to, is the legitimacy ascribed to certain ways of life through the
mechanism of religious sanction by any one of the various modes of acceptance peculiar to each religion, such
as the Smanra of Prophet Mohammed, or the writings in the Bible or Pentatcuch for Christians and Jews
respectively.
" lee general§- H AuLAQ eymfinote 67.
rCT
ISH
Custom refers loosely to "de oanal y of behaving or actin' See THE CONCISE OXFotn DIrTisrNy OF C:REENT
uF, LAW IN Tsrr MlAKIsc 67 (1997): "The mere existence of a saety ehewnertpheraliy of indiidual,
286 (1994). Seealso C.K. AI.T
gin ie to cusoms font which tie single member of the toality can compleep divorce hoiseff.. oer 'bighly dei'eloped'. meiliked' soceies
of the modern world ar just as rplee ltb sodal customs as the primitive' sodetder of the past or the Warknard' saesec of loda'... o
wtr/i degrer tMy ai possess a eanction: to dirregard Mem inerive some kind of penalty... The real penishment of fer aimina ie
not in de deprivaton of/heir ikey7 but in the sligmata whirb sodetv itrf not jest the judge orjailer, brands rn thm." But then
Their sandion,
he differentiates between legal and non-legal customs: ")Wt none of thes ceutoms is completeA' ob/gata.
hbough
in many cafes ponih/ is mperfect.., legal custom eccirpies a place by i/setf n that its sanction is more certan in its operahen
than that of any other"
Derrect sass: "...nith all three sibztions, Jetish, Islamic and Hind, the contention is made, and is mvade antb eery show o/
horign arast to superbuman
plausibikly, that the oiler of law deriw from the word of God, fmr the senir of unique4 qteakfied easgr(
nisdo, or fron the practces ofpeople who may bepretmed to have enoyed guidance of eqnuiral quaity'. Ii i the faieh that tbe nries,
and lbeir mterpretaean, dane from sources hallowed by an occult pntr li addion to the onious quabdy of qge and expeience, wbich
juetifer ididearir in beieing that these rn/es alone orghs to be folkoed, wbater convenience there may bein eaefoning to the iner
laid down fraw time to time by homarr kgis/ae and by coarm." See DRrEvrr, supra note 7, at 97.

"Jewish Laur was bat/ressed 1g the cobeon of the cmeni, rinforced by pressure fan outside: its rtdes are the ea exprsion of thi
feeling ofchesn, leading to the rejection of all disstrdents." See ScHAcHT, snpra note 10, at 2.
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differed in this regard. In the Christian faith, there was a conflict between the church and the people."
There was no such conflict within Islam, merely a separation between the sacred laws that existed in
theory and the practices followed by the people. It can also be observed that traditionally,"' Islamic
jurisprudence is comparatively devoid" of historical depth. N.J. Coulson says:
"Master-architectsarefollond by buihim who implmented tbe plans; surcessiw generatos of
craftamen made their onw particalar conhibuiions to the fixtures, fitnigs, and interior d&or
und4 the task completed,futuerejurists wre simfb passive caretakers of the eternal edicte." 4
The Roman Linkages
The spheres of interaction and overlapping between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam can also be
examined in the context of the common influence of Rome in the advent of all three faiths. The
Islamic world was an expanding one35 With conversions and the spread of the Islamic influence in the
newly conquered territories, a point of impact between Islam and the juristic ideas that originated in the
later Roman world was inevitable. The reason for this was that the areas that came under Arab rule had
been exposed earlier to the Hellenistic way of thinking. This resulted in a process of absorption of
external custom that extended through the Umayyad period (661-750 A.D.)' This can be tied to two
causative factors; Firstl; that Islamic law itself was in the process of evolution and was not in a

"

Id. This invoked "I/th finer for political poor on the part of a tbtOrorgasiked ecrksiascal hierarnby and Canon lo was a one
ofs poitical iirapons."
Id. "lam aws nrera Ch brh',blowir low aws arin' supported ly an owganizedpower,conequent4 there neirdereed a rea tria/ of
irngtk terr aenrh emaird a disrdenge
benen the saWd Aw and :be reahly of acffalpretha of wbb the egidations framed br tbe
staie formed part, a gap imr or lss node arwnimg to pher and some,now and then on the point of brg losed bi5 condnal
eareriqng ise"
Perhaps this dichotomy existed as a consequence of the mechanism by which Islamic law
developed. It is Later proposed that: 'Islam rrpieied a mdral breakanwy fm Arab paganism; Islamic Ian, if tbe resnl of a
oetiny, f-e
a -rhgioes angle, of kgal sebect mailer ndich vw ar f r
nsform,
ipising as it did the arious omarponents
of the
laiis of Arabia and numers elements taken our fm; the pewple of the conquered teiories All this an urifed hr iig sndyeerd to
the same kind of seiiny tMe impact of which varied rrat, being almot non-exrient in some fiis,
and in others oginatntg nord

instfitutiour."
jumprnre... ins trakiehanalfborer, pmades a mnch more etreme examph (as moapaed to

ofa legal
Irenjrirpnidrnc)
o6ardened
ssiew
oion of tbe /an
iself /ng as asi
Wrtancalphenomenon dosily hed nihthbe pgrers of sodqr... The rv/i of the inditidualjurirt it eneasarned
y isr
pare stbj-tiee standard of its itrinsir wath in the proers of disory of i/bedie command It is rot cosidered r tbe Aght of aKy
external dieda or enilt relionshy to the drmstatces of particotar epocbs or localities." See NJ. Cot. zsoN, AHISTORY O IsLAMe
Mfais"
science

denrcedfor histoncal cunsideratas. Laj in classical Islmic theory is the remakd sill of God, or ine r
powrding and nor preeded by the Mit/im siate, controlng and not conroled by Alahm sdety. Then can ins heno

L%, 1 (1997).
But chis is a trend that is required to be addressed and corrected. This has already been initiated by Schacht and is

favourably appled by Coulson.

24

Covsws, spra note 21, at 2. Coulson describes the circumctances that suggest this perspective. However, this aspect
of Islamic law is not discussed in detail in this paper.
let.
"Many cates probiced the Arab epansion There were emnomic cause:. the decine of ontkr gonernment re the cenitry be/ore
Molammad had alnd
the irngnteon ysteme
of Ambia to decy, the lowered jel of the soil menaced the groing poplatia: banger
for arabk land may hse movd the MAfeyrm regments. Pokiial carses operated- holh Eygaerfnm and Persia, exharitied by Mor and
manal destion, are in a tempting dec/ar; n their posnces taxation rose arbk admiuistration apsed and prateron failed Raa/
affinite played a part Syroa and A esopoiania cotaoned Arab Inbes that find no &Jia/l is aeepoing feew the ande, then the /aith.
of the Arab inaders. Regornr cosideradoonr entern- Byzosndw oppression of the Monnphysies, Nestorians, and other seas had
alienated a lai majosity of i/be .jeian and Pgptdanpopulion, evensome of the imperial gardsions. Morale fatots were irn/hid:
Chbstian ethics and monaticr had redired in the near eat that readiness fir wor which characIerted Arab autom and Msimw
lizung The Arab troopt tre mreroronsr disoop6ined and moe ablk ld...". Wiu. DuRANT, Txr AcE Or FAri 188 (1963).
ScRAcHT, 0pm note 10, at 23.
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crystallized form as of yet. Secondly, due to the relative separation between religion and state, the state
was more concerned with administration, and generally allowed the evolution of new customs and
practices with time, as far as the lives of people were concerned. Therefore, it was possible for greater
flexibility in adaptation and change to exist, as far as administrative and legal practices were concerned.'This process occurred through those who were educated in and exposed to both cultures. These
educated converts brought their familiar ideas, including legal concepts and maxims, with them into
their new religion3 8 Schacht observes:
"This is not an isolatedphenomenon. Talmudic and Rabbinicallanu too, contains concepts and
maxims of classical Roman law which entered it through the medium of popular Hellenice
rhetoric, and the same is the case, as.ear as can be seen, of Persian Sassanian law which itsef
came into contact with Taledic law"
The requirement of preserving the existing administrative structure in the provinces resulted in the
absorption of a number of foreign institutions and concepts, because of which the legal status of nonMuslim subjects under Islamic law was modelled largely on the position of the non-citizen groups in
the Eastern Roman Empire?' This process was largely forgotten with time and came to be accepted and
remembered as the ways of the people and as a part of Islamic life. This, however, does not take away

"Concepts and maxims orignatig from Koman and Bytantine lan; from the Canon lam of Eastern Chadenes, femn Taaldic and
Rabbinic la, and fro Sasranian law, infihraled nto the nascent rekgeons law of Islam ding its period of infiltration, to appear in
the doctrines of the ' rentury AD." SeeCouisoN, supa note 21, at 21 and SCHACHT, sapra note 18, at 26. The interplay of
instituunn is surnmarized as below;
External influence

Islamic concept/institution

ater est quea np/iae demon.rtrant

'al-awlad la frasb'

1.

(The child belongs to the marriage bed)

(Roman)

2.

Security for payment of debts

tignus' (Roman)

3.

Contract of 'Para'
(kia, qara proper,ji)

'/o cad conductio' (Roman)
(L. ri, ic.peranum, I. open)

Law of Sale
(mabil, rsawna, oa'dad)

'quae pondem anemer mensura
constant' (Roman)

4.

5.

Adultery (Shiite and Khayi law)

Canon law of Eastern Churches.

6.

Qeyst (also istishd4 tdslab)

Judaism (Aramic root: /ssqqish)

7.

'Ipra' (consenus of scholars)

'opinio pnennos (Roman)

8.

'Lakf (religious trust)

'piae causat' (Eastern Churches)

9.

'KaiVb (Clerk of the Court)

Sassanian Law

10.

Contract of 'Dbianotd

'Fidel (Roman law)

11.

'amil as-suq'

'Agoronomo/ (Byz. mkt. inspector).

12. 'tad/i (root DLS)
a

'dols (Byzantine Greek root

DoLoS)

"The intennedearies aermthe uttalird non-Arab/ anvets to Islam who (or whose fathers) had enjoyed a kheral education, tbal is to ray,
an education in Heleaistic helonc aiSh was th normal cme in countier of te Firdil Crescent of the Near East abirh the Ambs
conquered This ediucadn iavasiah led to some acquaintance vih th* rdments of lami which uis considered neeseary for the oratorr
Iicr, stipra note 10, at 20.
who were aho advocates, and usefulfor all edtratedpersons" S
.
rId

~'COttsoN, supra note 21, at 27.
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from the influence these practices had on Islamic thought. Rome also influenced the Jewish way of life
and its jurisprudence in a similar manner.
Sunna from Arbitration
There are four sources3 ' of law in Islam - the Koran, the Sunna, Ijma and Qiyas. The Sauna of Arabia
arose out of the decisions made by the hakam, or arbitrator. These decisions were binding and were
made largely on the custom of the time. This developed into the approved tradition, or the Stunna.
Arab society was largely based on this doctrine of traditional right and wrong. In operation, this meant
that the view of the group as a whole (expressed as the tradition) was considered to be the authoritative
voice; any deviation from tradition was frowned upon. This was the pre-Islamic scenario in Arabia. A
formidable barrier in itself, this resistance to change was a major obstacle that Islam had to overcome. As
will be shown," this barrier was ultimately breached, but re-emerged as the establishment of the S'nna
of the Prophet. It would seem ironic that Islam ultimately employed the same mechanisms that it had
worked around to establish itself, for its maintenance as well. The only way of life was the traditional
way that allowed for no innovations. This does not mean that innovation did not occur. But the
changes that did occur only did so because they were co-opted into the larger group of S.nna.
The Ummayads
Law under the Ummayads" developed as a unifying force of administrative co-operation that required
the political organization of the extended Arab society.' It was under their rule that the post of the

For a study of the mception, origin and development of the Jewish religion, faith, and jurisprudential thought as
an independent body and dis-a-tis lslam and Christianity, seeDuRANT, suspra note 11, at 350. Durant describes the
manner in which the Tomb is a representation of the oral law that was passed down from the period of Moses in
sddtion to the written law that was the ppenlateaeh
n Interestingly, the basis of this lies in religious tradition too. "A wl-authentcated tradition nich is to be found in the
kitab-us-sunan of Abn Dawud 4gistani as well as the Musnad-i-Darimi and the colkecdon of A/n Abdlab TinMdhi, inwsit
there for .ources sith the approcwl of the Prophel bimself For it is related hal aben Mu'adh we beng sent to the Yemen, the Prophet
asked him on oat he nettld bare his dedsions: '7 ailljudge them acording to the Book of God," he replied '"But of tat mn/ns
nothing to the prpose?" 'Then upon the precedents of te Prophet." 'But if that also fails joai" 'Then I ad/I make efforie to form 1ur
own jspigement." And the Prophet raired bur hands and said, '7raise beto God, ho gder the messenger of his Parphet in abat He
pleares." SeeF.R TYrAwp,
Musitm La: THE PERSONALaw OFMusuas IN INmt AND PAKisAN 1 (1968).
'The Koran is te first source of law its importance is rehgious and pitual,no ossthan legal as it is, en Meshm behef the Woed of
God. The seand sourceof laie is the Sunna, the praces of the Paphet." But this has gone through a process of cvoluion
osunnat-al"The aed Sunna' was nsed in pr-Islamic times for an ancient and continans urage, well artaLbshed in the animnuei (
umma); latec the ten ws appled to the Practice of the Prophet (sunna-al-nabi). The wod Sunna mus be distinguisbed fiac ibe
term hadith',for a pronciratrue of the two terms leads sometimes to oenfision of the theught. Hadith' is the story of a partiular
occmnce; Sunna, thenib of law deduced from it, is the )5macha' of the Pphet, his 'model hehatiour' The tio sones, Koran and
called hass' (hindg ordinane) and rpresent dimat and indract rvltion. The tbird source of law is ijma',
Sunna" as oftesn
conrenss of opinion among tMelearned of Ibe communigy. The fourth and last onm of t last is qiyas, nalogical deductioa. It is
t0
derived from tbe Judh term itqish', from an Aramic root, meaning 'to heat logether"' See A.A.A. Fvziu.n, OLix
MlcusrstNADAN Law 19 (1987).
Seepart entitled "The Quest for Legitimacy", at 40.
The Umayyad dynasty ruled from A.D. 661 to A.D. 750, when they were supplanted by the Abbasids. Theirs was a
period of reorganization and bureaucratic centralization, which was in opposition to "Bedonin indiidnalsm and the
anardy of the Arab waygof bfe." They were also largely concerned with war against a host of enemies, including the
Byzantnes, the collection of revenue from subject populations and the maling of payments to Arab
beneficiaries. See SCHACHT, sapra note 10, at 23.
Coulson describes this phenomenon in the context of the requirement that the Umayyad rulers had to face,
leading to the adoption of many foreign customs. Seealo CouLsox, lyra note 21, at 27.
"
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kadF was established, in order to satisfy the new needs of the extended urban centres. While the kadis
were delegates of the governor, they effectively laid the basis of Islamic law in their decisions. This
development was followed by a gradually increasing specialization in this field. Religious specialists,
through their analysis of customs, as a response to disparities between religion and practice, extended
the scope of religion into the law. The specialization occurred as a natural consequence of the conflict
that occasionally occurred between different customary laws that jockeyed for application by the kad
Specialists appeared in the form of people who could understand this apparent conflict, as well as the
one that occurred between customary law and Islamic norms.
Differences as per Place
Islamic law, in its origin and form, varied from place to place. While the Bedouins populated most
regions of Arabia, Mecca, Ta'if, and Medina were centres of trade and, therefore, possessed a more
evolved form of commercial law as compared to the rest of Arabia. There also existed differences in
marriage norms between these major centres. 3 These differences were based more on the geographical
and economic settings than on core methodology or principle. However, there was a uniform acceptance
among both the Bedouins and the urban centres that the basis of the law lay in the recognition of
established customary practices. In the second century of Islam, centres of Islamic thought were
established. Major schools evolved in Iraq and Hijaz. In this setting, ideas flowed from the more
advanced centres to the others." According to Schacht:
"...the doctrine of the andent schools of Medina and Kufa refct the social condtions
prevaiing in H#a and in Iraq re.peci/vey, where the society of Iraq appears as less archaic and
more diferendated, but also more ngd in its structure than that of HJao"'
For example, Medinese society remained faithful to the traditional concepts of Arabian law, while in Kufa,
which was predominantly cosmopolitan, the standards of a closely-knit tribal society were alien." Their
common ground lay in the explicit provisions of the Koran and in such precedents of the Prophet and the
early Caliphs as had been preserved in the Umayyad legal practice, but outside this restricted field, the
freedom of personal reason enjoyed by the kadir and other scholars inevitably produced different results.
This was largely influenced by prevailing local conditions, which had a major impact on the development of
the law. For example, in Kufa there existed the practice of allowing non-agnatic heirs, while this was not
true of the patrilineal society of Medina9 Similarly, the class-consciousness that was prevalent in Kufa led
to the principle of marriage equality, which did not appear in the closely-knit society of Medina.The kadi was an Islamic judge. This post evolved when pre-Islamic arbitration by the hakam was no longer adequate.
Their jurisdiction extended to Muslims and frequently performed many of the functions of the Governors.
Seegeneraly SCHACHT, spra note 10 for examples.
"Influences of the doctrine of one school on that of another almost inaniab preededfrom Iraq to Hyaz, and not tsie versa, and the doctrinal
development of the schoolof Medina often logged behind tbat of the schoolof KufO." SeeScH AcHT, supro note 10, at 29.
'"Li

'

o

Kuls was a town in Iraq, which had started as a military camp; the mixture of diverse ethnic groups in a predominantly
Persian milieu produced a cosmopoLitan atmosphere in which the standards of a closely-knit tribal society were
alien,
The logic in Medina was that the Koran did not specifically grant such relatives rights of succession. In Kufa, the view
was that by recognizing the rights of women relatives, the Koan implied the rights of relatives connected with the
propositus through them. CouLSON, suo note 21, at 48.
"Class consdonsness in Kufa, stemming fom the wngakd natur of its sodely where Arabs and non-Arab Matins were in indimate
cana, and fm the traddon of social saeifeadion in the Sassrania Persian empia, produced the doctrine of manrage equaky." This
doctrine required the husband to be the equal of his wife (or her family) in various specified respects, including
lineage, financial standing, and profession. Id at 49.
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Shias and Sunnis
As far as the differences between Shia and Sunni law are concerned, one initial problematic assumption
that has to be overcome is that the two schools pursued their individual courses of juridical
development immediately after their separation. The major point of contention has been on the matter
of whether all major points of difference were worked out before or after the schism." While the
traditional view has been that the differences appeared before the schism, recent research has shown
otherwise." The basic point that appears is that, as far as those aspects of the law that these schools
share are concerned, it is not possible for there to have been a consensus between them at a time when
these concepts had not yet been developed, which is what the traditional view would imply." It would
seem that there was, in fact, a great deal of interaction between these two schools, both before and for a
good period after the schism. Common doctrines were employed and differences, if required, came
about subsequent to the development of the doctrines.' On analyzing the traditions that they follow,
it may be seen that there exists a great deal of commonality between them."
The Living Traditions
The ancient schools of Islamic law arose in the second century A.D. with the increase in the number of
specialist scholars.4 These schools developed a theory of tradition that was based on the decisions of
the scholars at each school. They followed the principle of Ijma (consensus), and so the view of the
majority of scholars was taken as the representation of the tradition in question."' This was irrespective
of what earlier generations of scholars had decided in the context of the particular behaviour or action in
question. This tradition was expressed in the form of the Sunna, which now had a normative imperative
for its enforcement that was manifested in the opinion of the majority of scholars. However, the
scholars of each independent school, as a part of their consensus of opinion, did recognize that there
existed different schools with differing views? There was therefore some competition for legitimacy
among various schools. Consequently, a practice developed through which the Sunna that a particular
school proposed was attributed to an idealized figure of the past - the convention that arose was one
of attributing one's work to one's master.5 The purpose behind this backward projection was to
strengthen the supposed continuity of the traditions. It was inevitable that this method of backward
projection went through a logical sequence of attribution to greater and greater authorities, each a little

"

"Towardi the end of the period of the Caliphs of Mcdinaj the Islaic ammuonity was vet by po/tical schisms,and Me two heterodox
noirments of sheKharis and of the Shits established lbemselear beside the orthodox Anni mnajont" See SCHAcHT, supa note 10, at
16,
Sd
at 16

*
"

*
9

'

*

Id at 16.

Id "For some considerable time, and dmring the second and third centuries of Islam in parlialar, thp (the Shia and Kharji schoolh)
remaied in suaea/i close contact wilh the Sunni communer for them to tace ovr Islamic law at it
bur
eing deMelod in the
orthodox sools of lau making on4 such modrficaties at r required by their particular poitical and dcgmatic tenets, and
elaborating their on legal theories whhi, honewr are the real hAsesof their positive docrines as litte as the /gl theory of the Sunnis
is of theirs." Examples include the approval of temporary (mnt') marriage and the doctrine that the concubine who
has borne a child to her owner may be sold. This was neither Shele not Suim at first, but later was identified as
Shia.
Id at 17,
Id at 23,
Id at 28.
Id at 30,

The Kufians, who attributed the doctrine of their school to Ibrahim al-Nakha'i, first did this. Id. at 31.
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further back in time. The logical culmination of this process was the attribution of traditions to the
Prophet himself, who was the ultimate authority. In this manner, the SAnna of the Prophet now arrived
as the final and highest authority among the traditions.
However, as a response to this method of majority consensus jurisprudence, the Traditionist movement"
arose. The Traditionists took the next logical step and associated the practices that they supported with the
practices and teachings of the Prophet Himself, passed down by eyewitnesses,5' who were supposed to
have heard what the Prophet said or did in His lifetime. These stories were allegedly passed down through
the generations. From one perspective, those who proposed these traditions believed that this would have
been the action of the Prophet if He had been faced with a similar situation. There being no higher
authority, once the Traditionists, through a slew of eyewitness accounts, were able to prove that the
customs they sought to implement were directly sourced, there was little challenge for this logic. The aims
of the Traditionists were to impose laws that were harsh and rigorous As the Traditionist movement
operated as a response to the living traditions, its natural mandate was a continuance of a chosen statw quo.
This involved choosing a particular practice that they wanted to continue, and attributing it to the highest
authority possible, after which the living tradition system would die, because there could no longer be
consensus and change in such a situation as before. But, in order to prevent an adverse impact, the schools
of law did resist and managed, in many cases, to interpret even the eyewitness traditions to their
advantage." This led to a stalemate in Islamic juristic thought.
Traditions and Reason
Traditions as a source of law did not act in isolation but along with the method of reason that is
integral to the Islamic way of thought. Reason (ra) as well as kiyas and irdbsan) is just as integral to
Islamic thought as tradition. Views based on reason were strengthened by their conversion into
traditions with time. Schacht describes the influence of reason thus:
"The element oJfpersonaldiscretion and individualopinion in Islamic law waspriorto the growth
of traditons, pardiculary of traditions of the Prophet, but because of the success of the main
thesis of the Tradiionaists,most of what had oraginalb been discreionary decisions and the
result of indizidual rasoning by the scholars was put into the mouth of the Prophet.""
Not restricted to Arabia, this process spread throughout Iraq and Syria. Traditions grew increasingly
important and were relied on to a greater extent to determine the correct course of action. The

"The main thesis of the Traditionists, as opposed to the andent schools of lan; ws that formal "traddons" of the Prophet derising from
the Prophet superseded the thing tradtions of the school... The Traditionirts er not confined to Medina bet enired in all the gnat
centres of Islam where ther formed groups in opposition to, but newrtheler in contact adth, the local school of law They dishked all
human nraroning and personal opinion which had beome an integral part of the Reing tradidon of the ancient schools and which had,
indee4 been a constituent element of Islamic lgal thoughtfrom its rar beginning?' It is, of course, a different matter that the
practices they promoted were of doubtful authenticity themselves. See id. at 34.
* The Traditionists produced detailed statements or traditions which claimed to be the reports of ear or eye
witnesses on the words or acts of the Prophet, handed down orally by an uninterrupted chain (irnad of
trustworthy persons. SeeTY'Aapi, supra note 32, at 254, where he cites an alleged view of the Prophet about begging
- seny it is better for one of you to take your rope and bring a bundle of wood pon your back and sell it, in which caseGod guards
hs honor- hai to beg of people, whether they gew him or not." This tradition is originally in support of the arguments
restricting the types of people who are allowed to beg. See also TYAai, sipra note 32, at 493, where the validity of
of wakfs, ray tbe Ghayst
oszkf is sought to be justified on the basis of a tradition of the Prophet - "the wk'
Bayan, isfounded on Mherile laid doue ly the Paphet himseffand banded dowu in succession by Ibn Aue Nafe and tIN Omar."
*

'
'

SccaT, spra note 10, at 35.
Id at 40.

35

Vol. 14

Student Bar Review

2002

differences become apparent with time - for example, the legal thought of Abu Yusuf contained a great
deal of traditions when compared to those who came before him. 7 This was because more traditions
from the time of the Prophet existed in his time. Similarly, Shaybani" showed an even greater
dependence on tradition, invariably using it to round off his arguments and paved the way for the
approach of Shafi'i.
The Abbasid Period
In the period of the Abbasids," the Caliphs followed the sacred law that was expressed in the form of
the Smoma.' If an action of a Caliph deviated from the accepted practice in that regard, it was denied (by
the kah) to possess the power of law6 ' This was because the powers of the Caliph were supposed to
be regulated by and were based on what was allowed by the Sunna of the Prophet." In practice,
untrammelled powers were not available to the Caliph. In the past, the practice had been different there had been, to a large extent, conversion of legislation into tradition' before the advent of the
Traditionists. It was just that this door was now closing. But new means and methods were developed
by which the necessary process of legislation could continue - freeing the area of administrative action
from these shackles accomplished this objective 4 However, differences remained between what was
followed in different places. There were calls for a codification of sorts (Ibn a/-Makaffa)," based on a
realization that the Sunna of the Prophet had actually arisen in the Umayyad period, and was born of
individual and arbitrary reasoning. The emergence of different schools of law on the basis of the
declaration of tradition took place in this manner through the Abbasid period. Schools that had differed
due to geographical differences coalesced together into circles of law that followed the broad principles
of a central authority - person - with differences being applied as and when the need arose." The
factors that had acted during the Umayvad period, such as geographical and cultural differences,
continued to operate under a broad umbrella of Islamic unit.

Id at 44.
He was a disciple of both Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf. His systematic reasoning was, however, of a high quality; and he
greatly systenmazed the doctrine of Kufa. Id. at 45.
The Abbasids overthrew the Umayyad dynasty in 132 A.H, (A.D. 750). Political and legal criticism of the Umayyad
rulers came to a head when this took place, and there was a call For a law that was more "in tbe pieit of the orgised laws
of Islam propounded in the Koran." SeeCousox, sipra note 21, at 37.
SCHACHT, supra note 10, at 49.
Two traditions that explain this were retrospectively attributed to the Umayvad Caliph Umar ibn 'Abd a 'Azi; "No one
has the nght to personal opinion on points settled in the Koran; the peronal opinion ofthe Cahths concerns those points on nd/dla there is
no revelatonin the Koran and no ia/id Sunna frw; the Prophet; ao one has the nght to personal opinion on pointr se/ed in a Sunna enaced
ly tbe Prophet." Id. at 53.
Id. at 52.
Id at 53 "1What war amal) legisladion of tMeCaliphs of Aledina, and partiular4 of the Umayyads, had to a great extent, dirrcty 1
eing approwl and inire// by prokng contrary colit/ions, entered iato te fakner of Ishrnic lam"
"A duAk administration of jastia, one rehAour and erased ly the kadt an the baus of the Sharia, the other semiar and exercised b tr.
poklical anthoiees on the basi of custom, of eqytd and fairntess, sometimes of anrbitroeines, orgovrnmental regula/tons and in modern dmes
of enaced codes,
has preled anpracical# the whole of/he Islamc or"
See id at 54-55.
See id. at 55. He shows that the matter of complaint was that the wide divergences in urisprudence, and in
administration of justice which existed between the several great cities and between the main schools of law, either
perpetuated different local precedents or came from individual reasoning which was either faulty or was sometimes
pushed too far.
For example, the Medinan school became the Maliki School and the school of Kufa became the Hanai School. Id at
59.
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Shafl'i
Shafi'i, who lived in the second half of the second century of Islam, was one of the most important
Islamic jurists."' The process that he followed was one of strictly analogical reasoning." He did not
agree with strictly individual decisions, which could be tainted with arbitrariness? According to Shafi'i,
law was to be implemented solely on the basis of the traditions of the Prophet The interpretation of
these verses was to be conducted in the light of the Sunna of the Prophet. This was a doctrine of
rigidity. There was no space for individual speculation, or the consensus of scholars, in a sphere that was
dominated by the aforementioned tradition, the supposed repository of which lay within the general
consensus of the Islamic people. The endeavour of Shafi'i was to eradicate the basis of differences
between the various schools by drawing traditions backwards in time to one single and common source
- the Prophet - and referring to one genuine Islamic tradition.' Shafi'i attempted to raise the Sinna of
the Prophet to an inviolable and inaccessible position. However, he did not succeed. This was because a
new classical theory of law arose as a response by the Traditionists to the contributions of Shafi'i. They
reasserted the consensus of the scholars and the living tradition. At the same time, they overcame the
hurdle of the Prophet's tradition by extending the sanction of the consensus of the sciolars to Shafi'i's
identification of the Sunna with the contents of traditions from the Prophet. The living tradition, in
effect, re-absorbed the doctrine of Shaff'i through the same reasoning that he had employed to break
away from it. However, there could be problems with this manner of a consensus. In order to regulate
this, a mechanism of validation arose around the traditions; this incorporated tests to determine the
authenticity of a tradition' that, once satisfied, created valid traditions. At the same time, it is pertinent
to note that this process does not imply that none of the traditions of the Prophet owe their origin to
His ways. It is reasonable to assume that, in His various roles, the Prophet did make apparent His views
on a variety of matters social and political and some of these later traditions could be traced back to the
source to which they are attributed.

Smriti as Tradition - a Comparative Analysis
Sources in Comparison
The sources of Hindu law were fourfold - Shrud (Vedas), Smrin, approved usage and that which was
agreeable to good conscience." Tradition (Smnih) differs from revelation (ShrtA) inasmuch as it is not a

6' "In 4rafi a nimparison bhrnen Aba Honfda, Mak and Shafi... Shaf appears miuchku a transminer of hadith and egal op/iion
and more os afjeie holng opinions of his oaw." WARt B. HALLAQ, AUTHoRunr ConTu[n AND CHANGE IN LAlilC LAw 38 (2001).
"
SCHAcHr, supra note 10, at 60.

2

Shafi'i said that while the Prophet was a human interpreter, His legal decisions were divinely inspired. The
recognition of the traditions of the Prophet as a source of the divine will complementary to the Koran is the
supreme contribution of ShaPi to Islamic jurisprudence. Their authority could only be questioned as far as the
authenticity of their reporting was concerned, not on the merits of what they stated. "In the ean5 schools, Sunna bad
sgnfed ersendal the lmal iradiion of the indidal school By replaang this concept of a trdihon, whirb bad,for Islam as a whole,
a adipldly of stating points, oith that of a tradiion which stemmed frm one single ongn - the oclions of Miohammad - Shafil
aspired to eradate a root canse of diversity hetween the several centres and instil inmformity into the doctrine." See CoTsoN, .mpra note
21, at 56. In essence, then, this amounted to a fusion of the two broad trends that had operated in Islamic law so
far.
This happened by the creation of a state of affairs where the terms of Snna themselves were decided upon b
the scholars through consensus.
One such validation was based on the number of people who authenticated it.
MULLA, Apra note 1, at 3
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direct or heard perception of the divine precepts, but an indirect perception founded on memory."
Differentiation between those matters that are enforceable under law, and those that are not, is not made
under the Smiids, under whose ambit all actions that are discussed are equally binding on the
conscience. 5 The Snsrids can be divided into the Suta.r (including the Dbarma Sutras) and the metrical
Snrdlis (such as the Man' Smrift). The Dharma Sutras dealt mainly with duties that the people were to
keep in mind during the course of their various relations. In the course of time, these duties began to
be accepted as authoritative by members of all the groups under the umbrella of the faith 6 The essence
of the Smrids is the continuance of customs and institutions that have achieved legitimacy over time.
This was inclusive of the practices that were conducted under the authority of these customs." One
comparison that can be made with Islamic law is that these traditions retained the space for a certain
flexibility and adaptability with time."
Furthermore, due to the structure of these sources of law, the Smrids came to overshadow the sources
of their supposed origin - the Shrhir. One consequence of this view was that in those areas where the
Vedas were silent, the Smit was presumed to be the law, as it had been passed down from sages who
were well informed of the Vedas." Some commentators also feel that in the case of a conflict between a
Shad6 and Smadi, the SAid should have higher authority."' The Vedas as such did not deal with much
practical law and would not be as useful or accurate as the Smrii would." This reflects the trend in
Islamic law, where the interpretations made by the scholars as per the Koran were not open to analysis
and readjustment, due to the special qualifications that these scholars possessed, both in terms of
geographical and temporal position.

'"Shruri mean, ktera/4, that irch was beard Smriri means, literal4, recollection The Shrun was accepted as the onginal teving of
the ,greatpoor. The Smritis, thouh accepted as preceptr awanaiyf rm that source, nes coached in Thenords of the Rishis or sagesof
Supomn. 1 at 9.
antiqtdy who saw or meind the em/adons and proclaimed their
This its in contrast to Iaw, which declsres certain acts illegal, and certain legal, irrespective of their moral niure
DEav.rr, supra note 8, at 98.

troletions.'

Muiu,

mepronote 1, at 12.
Efficacious usages werc frequently incorporated by recognition. An example is the treatment of the concept of

prescription, in regard to which Yaonavalkyo laid down a period of 20 years for recovery by the lawful owner of
the land and 10 years for the recovery of a chattl enjoyed by a stranger. MuJA, stpra note 1, at 11.
"When Man te/s es that dfereat cntom prnneled in effirent ageshe sggests that the social codeis not a fixed hni a fleabk one
Soasl customs and insitutions are seolect to chage." SeeDanarr, supra note 7, at 29, and at 89; "Certain not oery important rules
found in the Smritis con/d he embaersig if hd/ Aoithaot amendment, and this amendment often wont byond the boundr of
this, as its ro mnony
found in the Smritis .i
interpretation. As an example one may take the hirts of soeghit, mearurem and coons
prachcal contoxls, the wirds of the texts were not almed to restrict the a/&oy of prkc acts or necersary instiftmoss... certain
aquoaionsfound in the Smritis and incompatible oith the demands of onseoapoary Rf, if incapable of removal or relegation by
eaterprartion or. . other methods.. could be abrogated by a simple condemnation as loka-vidvista, intolerable io /be plbhc" Se aso
Mum , rpra note 1, at 2- "The traditional law was itsoefgruerded on immemonal custom and provided for inchelon of approred
meaghtome to hefolkwed and emted by the people."
artom, i.e., pracices and usages lbatfew de do
"The Smisa though accepted as precepts manating from sheShruci, mee cooched in the aods of the Rishis or Sagesof antiqtity /ho
saw or rceised the revelations and proclaimed their escollections... as Mana deribes - By Shruid, or what waes beard from abow is
meant the Veda. By Smriti, or whsi way rememberrd from the gonming the bodh of law" SeeMolA, supra note 1, at 4.
Id at 18.

tim

"Id.

at 4. See also DERRETT, supra note 7,

at 200.
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Regional Lawmakers
The Smriis were blends of religious, moral, social and legal duties," which often had a social basis in
them." While there was not always a distinction made by the Smritkart? between law and morality,
when required, the rule that advanced dhamawas applied. A comparison that can be made with Islamic
law is that of the role of the Smridkarr as virtual lawmakers. Srid law consisted of notions of the
manner of behaviour that was to be followed. These differed from region to region, but purported to
owe their origin to one central source or authority These differed from region to region, but were said to
originate from one central authority that was superior to temporal authority and was the basis of
judgement of ones behaviour." The only duty of temporal authority was the enforcement of these
laws (danda) based on an acceptance in general. Further, while the Smtiis may be divided into a variety of
types," their power is one of persuasion. They are not binding on an administrator. This is important
because it reveals that there was a great deal of flexibility in the operation of the law, as was in the case of
Islam. While there are good reasons to follow the Shrtiis, circumstances may have demanded otherwise
and such an action was not considered a sin." The creation of the class of kajs, who were the
originators of traditional practices under Islamic law, was similar to that played by the Brahmin caste in
Hinduism. They played the role of both teachers and arbitrators - as a result, a literature of sorts
arose." At a later date, specialized schools were established, where specialists in the law could further the
analysis," as was also done in the case of Islam.

supra, note 1, at 8.
"Wh" llhe aitority wich jsified the application of the law was admitedy rehgionr, the rdes themseles could and in fict did poisy
by virtue of their own meit and nt meely by reason of a seperstitions anction attaching to their alleged sonme," See DFnarr, supra
Muius,
X

note 7, at 102
Seealso DERRET, sNPra note 7, at 8: "Ther are to befoand.. nmerous texts in the Smritis illustratue of the dir/incion betwen la
and moraity ppcable to questions ahere it as felt neessary to emphasize any such point of distinction. The distinction when not
war because the Iest lk war regarded as that whidh adanced dharma."
obsenewd

The Rishis who compiled the Smakx were known as the Smelikars and what they said was regarded as the
principle direct evidence of Dbrma "The Smritikars did not armogate to themselves the position of law-makeri bat only dtained
to be exponents of the divine precepts of law and compilers of traddon handed down to them and cling to that position even enbel
introdadng changes and reforms." Mu.A, sspma note 1, at 10.
* "The emphasis ns on the practie of dharma - an expression which came to smgnf the priege, diies and obbligations of a nan, his
standard of condeud as a member of the Aryan community, as a member of one of the castes and as a person in a particular stage of
life." See Mlurm, supra notel, at 5.
6
DERRET, upranote 7, at 10.
SMruA,

*

"

sipra note 1, at 8.

Id. at 98. The Bhaviya-pnraaa describes five types of Smfitis - "Those whirb have a "seen"purpose (serve a practical object
on#), those which have an "enseen" purpose (whose oied is not discerned by reason alone, those which partake of both charaers, thoue
which am based upon reason (i.e., propositions of logic and natural reason), and those which bave no specfica/h injuntive force becanse
they mere repea a rule laid down in the Veda es.phitl."
DERRETT, supra note 7, at 99. "The extensve rules relating to adanastration ofjostice, equay4 aitl these refening to polics and
international relations, are binng only so far as the indisidnal esponsible for the administration chooses, in his discrtion, to reognir
their fora. There is every reason oadybe sthould choose
to do so; there most bepresing reasons why he shond, in a particular case,choose
not to do sa Buet if he actr conlrary to a drstarcha nikl (hating a porpose which s drsit - seen,oboios or world) he commitr no sn
so long as the general requments of dbarea are met and he keeps wi/hu bi juriedction as the dharma shastra naderstands it."

"' MIA, supra note 1, at 4.
" These include, for example, the Dharmasterr of Gautana, Iaudhayana, Apastamha, Harmia and Vasishiha. of the
brother1 Shankha and Likhita, tUshana; the Smriti of Manu, commentaries on his work by Kulluka, Medhatfihi and
Govindaraja, the Mgujajalkyasnsriti, the Naradasuriti, the Parasharsartiti and the Smid of Brihaspati, to name a few See
id. at 10.
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The Quest for Legitimacy
Another analogy that can be drawn between the two religions lies in the manner in which the sages who
compiled the Smrins sought legitimacy This was done, as in Islam, through the argument that whatever
they laid down was agreeable to good conscience, their role being that of compilers of tradition handed
down to them and not that of lawmakers.' As with the post-Traditionist period of Islam, this
position was retained even when the sages sought to adapt and change the traditions.? In general,
however, there was an emphasis on attempts to harmonize rules that were not easily reconcilable," by
adopting the less abrasive interpretation." In addition, similar to the Islamic practice of backdating of
tradition in order to give it legitimacy, the Snridkars also employed a number of beneficial and elegant
fictions' in order to adapt the law.
While the Mana Sanii is considered to be of primary authority and importance, in general there is a
sense of mutual recognition among all the Smrith." The manner in which the Smiiths were treated as
complementary to one another is similar to the manner in which the various Islamic schools of law
recognized the existence of one another and the differences that accrued. In the context of the Maim
Snnid, another observation can be made. Law under Manu was attributed to him in a manner similar to
the way in which Islam backdated its traditions to the Prophet; the laws that Manu originally developed
were periodically reinterpreted and updated." However, the trend of attributing these traditions to him,
as the original exponent of the law, continued. Similarly, the manner in which the authorship of the
Narada Serili has been attributed to Devarshi Narada," one of the sages of antiquity, is another
example of backdating and is reflective of the process that was discussed under Islam. The chief
motivation for such a move was an attempt to give meretricious authority and age to these traditions,
which they would not have possessed otherwise.' The existence of the many Smrids was liable to
provide cause for clash and conflict between their various provisions. While preference was theoretically
given to that Snili that followed, broadly, the Mann Smrin, in practice factors such as reason and usage
were employed to overcome this deadlock."u

"
"
"

"
SId

DaEM, ripm note 7, at 11.
It appears thar in re-interpreting traditions in order to adapt them to what was really required, it was consistently
maintained that what was being done was a retelling, not a creation, of tradition.
MU..s, snpm note 1, at 37. "WeITke
thkgWge of a text wsi not o4 dar and tmrqsdtwal bat admittad of mot one maning
srb lauagea s aeganled as berd dedly theAtenion of the lajrr
and aepted ar aids. When, hower /be meang was not
saf-esaie the sense -ld Ie gathered by acvikg of tbe primpk of ecassary de
do.ors
of suffiaentfjaibity and sadr of
douAf#d asrptn aki hr ansrrd in the sense, whb if apparrnt kit cornet gmmaadc , w more i banony airb the intent of
the Lgw.er-.- This as akin to wh the later Roman Juirts calkd ficuo furis."
See id at 37, where the author discusses comments made by Narada and Yajnavalkya in this regard.
at 37.

"Of he nremar Smntis tke fir and formad in rank of authonr it the Manu Smriti. .. AU Smrius in the course of time came
to Ae gwrdd as of amauerrl *h4p don. No greear abhent am; attached to one than to another Simriti, ecept in case of Manu
Smriti, abiih Aw: recied as of the
d& thet antbodo." See Strawson, as note 4, at 18.
DFRRI'rY, sipr note 7, at 198.
'
MutsA. spr note 1, at 26.
" In the same way, the authorship of the Smnido of Brihaspau is attributed to this mythological sage who was the
preceptor of the Gods and whose name was immortalized by associating it with Guru, the largest planet of the
solar system Id at 28
1W According to Mulla, taing examples from the writings of Manu, Narada, and Yajnavalkya, recourse must be made
to an objective criteron (good custom) and a subjective criterion of ones conscience
The latter is a reflection
of iar. He further states that both of these tend to be blended in the act of interpretation, the role of which is
precisely to resolve conflicts between different SeidEr. This removal of conflict is what ShafNi also attempted to
do. See id. at 37.
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Conclusion
Islam chiefly deals with the personal relationship between man and God, and links all his actions and
modes of behaviour with the matter of judgment by God. Similarly, the unbroken tradition of Hindu
legal scholarship has emphasized the concept that Hindu law concerns itself with the idea of morality;
and not with material and temporal considerations."" One small difference between the two religions is
that in Hinduism, the priests form an additional link in the chain; they are the conductors of religious
events and ceremonies. This is present to a far smaller extent in Islam. But as far as obligations are
concerned, a division of sorts is also present in Hinduism." This is reflected in Islam (where acts may
be classified as wreb,fa%, and so on). The basis of traditions in both Islam and Hinduism also has
several common characteristics. In fact, the attribution of the sense of right and wrong to a higher norm
is common to most faiths. People generally have the ability to decide for themselves whether a particular
course of action, or a decision, is just or unjust. In the western world, this was a component of the
natural law debate."" This sense of justice is traced back to a higher authority - in the case of
Hinduism, this lay with the Smuitis that were a source of Vedic authority. Under Islam, the Koran plays a
similar role of being a representation of the higher norms of action. The manifestation of these norms
in the Sunna of the Prophet is analogical with that of the Smtis, which represent the dictates of the
Two further comparisons may be appropriate here. Firstly, the reasons these traditions were accepted,
adopted, and followed by the lawmakers (who later modified and adapted them according to their
interpretation of the prevailing requirement) was that this was a convenient method of developing a
common basis for jurisprudential thought. A similar situation was recognized by Shafi'i, who
understood the need for common ground between the various schools of law Another important
point can be made in relation to the social basis of both groups of religious traditions. In practical
terms, no law would have survived long if it was not grounded in the real requirements of the
community. In both Hinduism and Islam, law was gradually regulated by religion, but there was
definitely a non-religious basis to this law This was a practical, hands-on basis that operated in its own
right to give legitimacy to the law. Moreover, in both faiths, the rules themselves persisted by virtue of
their own merit and not merely because of a superstitious sanction that attached to their alleged
religious source. A final comparative observation that can be made is that within Hinduism, there is a
differentiation, as in the Islamic faith, between the laws and traditions that apply in different regions.
There are forces for commonality as well, as manifested in the practice of tracing traditions back to a
common source. But geographical and social factors did operate in the Hindu faith, as in Islam, to
influence its evolution."5

qpra note 7, at 101. See also ROBERT LINGAT, THE CLASSICAL LAW OF INDIA 10 (1963), where he describes the
manner in which all acts known to Brahmanism are individual acts, and are done for the spiritual advantage and
betterment of an individual (who normally covers the expenses that the various ceremonies entail) This is similar
to the Muslim concept of individual relations with God.
"" See Daitenr, supma note 8, at 11, where he describes the saula ritual, which is obligatory in theory, but is not widely
observed in practice. This is an example of the trend of obligatory practices present in both faiths.
''
LsnvOs INTRODUCTION ToJwRiSPRUDENcE 79 (M.DLA. Freedman ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1994).
See DERRErr, sipm note 7, at 109, where he uses the example of differences in the application of the seqoaz bar to
marriage with geographical distance, particularly in South India.
Dai--irr,
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This paper has presented modes of evolution and development of both the religions. The focus has
been maintained around the methods by which traditions have changed with time in order to meet the
changing circumstances, and how they obtained legitimacy. This leaves one with the thought that there is
a great deal of similarity between the manner in which both Hindu and Islamic traditions have
developed. This is because they have both responded to social situations and followed the same
mechanism of evolution. As can be seen, both historically provided for a similar degree of flexibility in
order for the faith to operate effectively at the ground level and to be looked upon favourably by its
adherents. Therefore, given a situation where the adherents of these different faiths live in a common
environment, traditions should be allowed to naturally evolve in response to the social settings. If this
happens, it is quite possible that more common traditions will evolve amongst these faiths, which
would be an encouraging development.
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